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Knapp Charles
TAKING CONTRACTS PRIVATE: THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN CONTRACT LAW
Charles L. Knapp*
INTRODUCTION
In his treatise on contract law, Professor Arthur Corbin ruminated
on the evolution of the doctrine of consideration. Knowledge of the
early English law and custom would, he observed, be of historical
interest and perhaps of practical value as well, in helping us
understand the evolution of this doctrine. "However," he concluded,
[w]e must be content ... without this knowledge, and must discover
our contract law and our doctrine of "consideration" from the
reports and records of recent times...
The reports and records of recent times! Courts and jurisdictions
scattered over all the continents and the seven seas! Cases by the
million! Libraries so labyrinthine as to require a guide! The leaves
of the books like the leaves of the trees! Who can now read all the
reports of cases dealing with the law of consideration ... ? Certainly
not the writer of this volume.'
Like Professor Perillo (and Arthur Corbin, for that matter), I am by
vocation a professor of contract law, which means that my
professional life consists mostly of teaching, writing and thinking
about what we conventionally refer to as the law of "contracts":
legally binding agreements. Unlike most of us teachers, however, who
only occasionally manage to put pen to paper, Joseph Perillo has done
a prodigious amount of thinking and writing,2 and his efforts-like
* Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to Hastings for its financial support for
this project, to my Hastings colleagues for their helpful suggestions, and to Hastings
student Dan Shulman for his valuable research assistance. None of them, alas, bears
any responsibility for the errors that remain.
1. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 109, at 162 (one vol. ed. 1952).
2. Law teachers will be certainly familiar with (and quite possibly users of) both
Joe Perillo's casebook and his one volume treatise on Contracts (both initially with
John D. Calamari; the casebook now with Helen H. Bender); students may also know
these and also are more likely than professors, perhaps, to be familiar with his Outline
of Contracts series (again, originally with Professor Calamari). He has also produced
a series of insightful articles about various aspects of contract law, and other areas as
well. And, of course, he has more recently taken on the enormous task of supervising
and partially writing the revised version of Corbin on Contracts. Joe has also been a
very supportive colleague over the years, to me and to other law teachers in his fields,
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those of Arthur Corbin, in whose large footprints he quite confidently
treads-have been devoted not to laying down a personal dictum of
what the law should be, fueled by some private vision of a utopian
economic or social order, but rather to the discovery of what courts
are actually doing (and why), in order to suggest what we might
expect them to do in the future.' Corbin's "working rules" of contract
law were necessarily no more than that, always subject to further
refinement and revision, because the work of the courts would never
come to an end.4 In the passage quoted above, Professor Corbin
eloquently describes the reports of decided cases as being so
unimaginably great in number that they must defy the efforts of an
ordinary mortal-even so extraordinary a one as Corbin himself-to
study and catalog. We must simply do the best we can, he says, and
proceeds to do just that.5
Nowadays, of course, all is different. Thanks to the silicon chip and
the World Wide Web, legal researchers can in a few minutes
accumulate amounts of information that in Corbin's day would have
taken months, even years of painstaking effort to pull together.
Stacks of three-by-five cards, reaching end-to-end nearly to the moon,
with laboriously hand-scribbled notes of citations, facts, holdings-
these were the stuff of legal research when giants like Williston and
Corbin roamed the earth. Today, with a few well-placed keystrokes,
one can count virtually (yes, pun intended) every tree in the forest,
and most of their leaves as well. Endless afternoons in musty
libraries, lugging stacks of heavy volumes from shelf to desk and back,
wearily blinking through tiny column after column of "Shepard's
Citations"-gone, all gone.
But other things have changed, as well. A century ago, disputes
over contract formation and interpretation routinely found their way
into the legal system-onto trial court dockets, into appellate reports,
and occasionally even into casebooks and treatises. For reasons that
perhaps defy tidy categorization (some of which will, however, be
and I have always been grateful for his interest and encouragement. It's nice to have
a chance to say so in print. For an example of Joe's sharp eye at work, see infra note
95.
3. In his preface to volume I of the revised Corbin treatises, Professor Perillo
declares his fealty to the central themes of Corbin's work: "evolution, uncertainty and
the need to validate theory with close analysis of court decisions." I Corbin on
Contracts iv (Perillo ed., 1993).
4. Corbin's original preface to his treatise, discussing his view of contract law as a
collection of "working rules," is reproduced in 1 Corbin on Contracts vii-x (Perillo
ed., 1993).
5. Professor Corbin was not always so diffident. In his preface to the revised
edition of Corbin's treatise, Professor Perillo discusses Corbin's role as a [non-initial-
caps] legal realist, an "evolutionist." In the course of that discussion, he quotes this
passage from a letter Corbin wrote to Robert Braucher: "I have read all the Contract
cases for the last 12 years; and I know that 'certainty' does not exist and that the
illusion perpetrates injustice." Id. at iii.
[Vol. 71
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suggested below), the one-time flood of reported cases has slowed to a
trickle. Who today can read all the significant contract-law cases as
they appear in "the reports and records of recent times"? Virtually
anybody, it appears-anybody with some time to kill and a decent
attention span. For the past few years I have taught at Hastings
College of the Law a seminar course which I call "Case Studies in
Contract Law," in which students are invited to undertake an in-depth
examination of a recent California case (in state or federal court)
involving issues of contract law. To prepare for the course, I have
each year surveyed both the California and Federal reporters, looking
for California decisions that present interesting contract issues. To
say they are few and far between is to overstate their number. Far
and away the most pervasive contract-related issue litigated during
this period has been this: Will the court enforce an arbitration
contract in the parties' written agreement?6 And the court's answer,
usually, is yes.7 Sometimes grudgingly, sometimes enthusiastically,
6. Ten of the thirty-three cases on my list of potential subjects for investigation
this semester (Autumn 2002) involve the issue of arbitration enforceability. See
Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.
Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d
892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002); Buckner v. Tamarin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Mercuro
v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Flores v. Transamerica
HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Benasra v. Marciano, 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 112 Cal Rptr. 2d
56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Cruz v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc., 111 Cal Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001). Free to choose from any case on the list with no urgings from me pro
or con, half of the students chose cases with arbitration issues.
7. Except for an occasional turn of phrase or perhaps a somewhat fresher
collection of cases, I claim no particular originality for the ideas in this article. The
writings on this subject are voluminous; those listed below in this note are probably
only the tip of the iceberg. See, e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The
Privatization of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy
Decision, 88 Ky. L.J. 183 (2000). I became aware of the Carr and Jencks article
literally on the eve of my submission of this piece, but it covers substantially the same
ground, with detailed attention to the practical differences between arbitration and
litigation, and makes many helpful suggestions for reforms that would improve the
adjudication process. As a contracts teacher, however, rather than a practice-and-
procedure person, I had until recently been relatively unaware of the revolution being
quietly effected in my chosen domicile of contract law by the explosion of mandatory
arbitration. Cases like Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998),
however, finally alerted me to what is going on here. My only aim in adding this brief
piece to a contract-oriented symposium is to make some slight contribution to the
contract/academic community's general awareness of these developments.
The history of arbitration in the courts has, as indicated above, been explored
in a large number of recent articles. The ones listed here have been particularly
helpful to me in considering this issue. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1237 (2001);
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 223 (1998);
Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. Corp. L. 331 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, Where
Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16
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but-yes, it will.'
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 293 (1999); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1344 (1997); Susan A. Fitzgibbon,
Teaching Unconscionability through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44
St. Louis U. L.J. 1401 (2000); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers
L.J. 399 (2000); Joseph R. Grodin, Some Observations on Circuit City v. Adams, 2001
Cal. Employment L. Rptr. 119; Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and
State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution
Process, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 397 (1998); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29 (1998); Frederick L.
Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts; Building Barriers to Consumer
Protection, 78 Mich. B. J. 302 (1999); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and
Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the
Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1203 (2002); Josef Rohlik,
Arbitrators Should Write Opinions for Parties and for Courts, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 933
(2000); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 1 (1998);
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33;
Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship
Reconsidered, 18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 479 (2001); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcome?, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1069 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 Tul. L.
Rev. 1 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1001 (1996); Monica J.
Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial
Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 844 (1999); Johanna
Harrington, Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter-The Credit Card Industry
is Deciding For You, 2001 J. Disp. Resol. 101. See also Katherine Eddy, Note, To
Every Remedy a Wrong: The Confounding of Civil Liberties Through Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 52 Hastings L.J. 771 (2001), (exploring
24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)), a
note which grew out of Ms. Eddy's participation in the seminar course discussed supra
note 6.
8. The articles listed in the preceding footnote have as a common theme the
expansive role that arbitration has played over the past several decades, differing only
in their conclusions about the desirability of that development. Somewhat
surprisingly, of the ten California (state and federal) cases listed in note 6, supra, the
court ruled against enforcement of the arbitration clause in seven. Circuit City, 279
F.3d at 892-95 (holding that clause in employment contract was unconscionable under
California law); Pagarigan, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95 (holding that adult children
were not bound by arbitration clause in agreement they signed on behalf of late
parent where they lacked authority to sign on his behalf); Buckner, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 491 (holding adult daughters of deceased were not bound in wrongful death action
by arbitration clause he signed during his lifetime); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679
(finding some aspects of arbitration scheme unconscionable); Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 382-83 (determining that arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable); Benasra, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359 (holding that president of
company was not bound as individual by arbitration clause in contract he signed only
in representative capacity); Cruz, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402 (finding that healthcare
patient's claims for injunction and restitution were not subject to arbitration). Note
the marginality, however, of several of these attempts to enforce the arbitration
clause (Benasra, Buckner, Pagarigan). And of course, Circuit City, at an earlier stage,
was a notable triumph for the pro-arbitration forces, closing off the possibility that the
HeinOnline -- 71 Fordham L. Rev. 764 2002-2003
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Why should this matter to me, or to you, or to anyone concerned
about the working of the American legal system? It matters because
the pressure for mandatory arbitration represents another step, and a
giant one, in the privatization of American contract law. This may
strike some readers as an odd, even oxymoronic observation, given
that in most analytic schemes, contract law-often referred to as "the
law of private agreement"-is generally considered already to be
"private" law, as opposed to various types of "public" law such as
criminal law or the law of torts.9 Of course, some would maintain that
there is no bright line between public and private law.'" As my
discussion below may indicate, I would probably be comfortable in
their company. But my point here, while related, is a slightly different
one: Whether contract law in the first instance is or is not "private"
law, the process by which contract disputes are resolved is indeed a
"public" process, and in the course of that process, "public" values are
brought to bear. The "rule of law" of which the American legal
community is justly proud involves not only the application of "rules"
of law, but also the working of a legal "process," in a public forum, as
part of a public discourse. Like private police forces" and gated
communities,12 the privatization of law represents a removal of
important aspects of civic life from the public realm to a realm in
which economic and social power are even more likely to play a
significant role-a kind of leveraged buy-out, if you will, of the public
weal. 3
Arbitration as a process of dispute resolution between willing and
relatively equal parties may well represent an untrammeled social
Federal Arbitration Act would be narrowly construed to exclude from its scope those
employed generally in interstate commerce, as opposed to those employed specifically
in interstate transportation. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001),
remanded, 279 F.3d 889 (2002). See generally Grodin, supra note 7. More
representative of the general judicial attitude toward arbitration clauses is Lagatree v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the discharge of employee who refused to sign arbitration agreement
was not in violation of his rights or public policy). But see McCoy v. Superior Court,
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding unconscionable an arbitration
agreement imposed as condition of employment).
9. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal and Harry G. Prince, Problems
in Contract Law 3 (4th ed. 1999).
10. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982). Professor Kennedy's article is one of a collection of
pieces on the public/private distinction, by (among others) Paul Brest, Karl E. Klare,
Morton J. Horowitz, and Robert H. Mnookin, in the same issue of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review. See also infra notes 11 & 12.
11. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165 (1999).
12. See John B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and the Fourth
Amendment, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1127 (1997).
13. 1 use the phrase "even more likely" because obviously these factors do already
play a major role in the outcome of legal disputes. See generally Marc Galanter,
Contract in Court: Or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About
Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577.
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good, and American courts were probably mistaken to resist its spread
in the early years of the twentieth century.14 Armed with the Federal
Arbitration Act,15 determined judges have completely overcome that
initial resistance. 6 But "mandatory" arbitration-arbitration imposed
by pre-dispute clauses in contracts of adhesion which, as a practical
matter, the non-drafting parties have no real power to avoid or
disapprove-will, if allowed to continue unchecked, largely deprive
American courts of the ability to play the important social role they
played so effectively throughout the last century. 7 And it will take
away, from those individuals and enterprises who need it most, the
protection of the law. Whatever else arbitration may be, it is not
"law"-the kind of findable, studiable, arguable, appealable,
Restateable kind of law that has characterized the Contract area for
over a century. The piece-by-piece dismantling of American contract
law is happening under our noses, right now. Maybe this process
cannot be stopped, but at least we should recognize it for what it is:
the abdication of any public responsibility for justice based on
something more than raw economic power."x
In this article, I comment on the state of contract law in general, the
adhesion contract problem, and the use of arbitration in contract
cases, from three temporal perspectives: the middle twentieth century,
the present day, and the foreseeable future. Having painted what I
hope will be a realistic picture, albeit with a concededly broad brush, I
close by sketching a few ways in which the shape of things to come
might be changed for the better.
I. TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONTRACT LAW
It has become a commonplace observation among contract writers
and teachers that American contract law underwent a major evolution
during roughly the middle half of the last century, from the "classical"
contract law exemplified by the teaching and writings of Professors
Langdell and Williston to what some of us at least are accustomed to
calling "modern" contract law. That transformation was
14. See generally Brafford, supra note 7. The same story is told in one way or
another in many of the articles cited in note 7 and the cases cited in note 59. The
history of this period is fully recounted in Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law
15-80 (1992).
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2002).
16. See infra note 59.
17. As Professor Richard Speidel has pointed out, the term "mandatory
arbitration" is perhaps misleading when used to refer to arbitration pursuant to pre-
dispute agreement. Speidel, supra note 7, at 1069. Nevertheless, it appears to have
become the standard phrase for this concept. See, e.g., Alderman, Edwards, Green,
and St. Antoine, supra note 7.
18. Note I am not asserting here that "justice" cannot or will not be the product of
some or even most arbitration proceedings; rather, that by enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion, the courts are deferring almost entirely to
private dispute resolution, "just" or not.
[Vol. 71
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foreshadowed in the writings of Professors Corbin and Llewellyn,
embodied first in portions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."), and then spelled out in painstaking detail in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Even at this meta-level of
generalization, it has to be conceded that the division between
classical and modern periods is not nearly so neat. Glimpses of
"modernism" can be seen in the first Restatement of Contracts, 9 and
the Restatement (Second) has "classical" (or perhaps "neoclassical")
aspects. 2° But the observation seems accurate enough in broad outline
to be useful as a basis for comparing the contract law of, say, 1930
with that of a half-century later-the earlier "formalism" (or perhaps
"conceptualism") of a "rules-based" system being contrasted with the
more "standards-based" system of the later date.2'
Apart from the possible operation of a "Statute of Frauds," the
classical system certainly did not rule out the possibility of enforceable
oral contracts.22 Nevertheless, to the extent that a written agreement
was created by the parties, that document usually ruled supreme; the
"duty to read," accompanied by a "plain meaning" approach to
interpretation and a "four-corners" parol evidence rule, along with a
judicial disinclination to allow equitable defenses, meant that anyone
who signed a document that he or she knew23 was intended to have
contractual effect could expect to be bound by whatever terms it
contained. 24  Along with a strong preference for basing decisions
wherever possible on questions of law rather than fact, this
Dominance-of-the-Document formalism seems from our vantage
point to have been the essence of classical contract law. Perhaps
reflecting the dominant laissez-faire ethos of American culture during
the half-century or so ending around 1930, this was a law for the lion,
not for the lamb; the well-heeled and well-counseled would find
classical contract law generally in their corner, while those less
fortunate could expect to fare less well.
By 1980, the wind had shifted, and indeed was to some extent likely
to be tempered for the shorn lamb. As noted above, Professor Arthur
19. Most notably the principle of section 90, now usually known as "promissory
estoppel." See generally Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of
Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J. 1191 (1998).
20. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 (1981) [hereinafter Restatement
Second] (retaining the pre-existing duty corollary to the consideration requirement, as
qualified (but not abrogated) by § 89 regarding modifications).
21. Knapp, supra note 19, at 1192-1203 (recounting essentially the same story).
22. For an example, see the hoary chestnut beloved of casebook editors and
contracts teachers, Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891), featuring an oral
promise by Uncle William to pay his nephew $5000 if the latter would abstain from a
variety of activities (smoking, drinking liquor, etc.) until reaching age 21.
23. Or "had reason to know," as the objective theory would add. See, e.g.,
Restatement Second, §§ 19, 20, 201.
24. See generally John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts
§§ 9.41-9.45 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter Calamari & Perillo].
20021
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Corbin had first in a series of articles and then in his multi-volume
treatise painstakingly examined the way in which courts in fact
applied contract doctrine in their decisions,25 and his influence had to
some extent been reflected in the first Restatement of Contracts.26
While Corbin was professedly non-doctrinaire in his approach, his
antipathy to the parol evidence rule in particular was evident and
influential. 7 Professor Karl Llewellyn had focused his sector of the
Legal Realism movement on contract law, particularly as seen
through the lens of sale-of-goods, 8 and had identified many ways in
which classical contract doctrine impeded the process of getting to
sensible outcomes in disputes between "business men."29 In Article 2
of the U.C.C., Llewellyn provided a variety of tools with which courts
could transcend rule-based doctrine to appreciate and effectuate the
commercial aims of the parties; concepts like "trade usage," "course
of performance" and "course of dealing," and "good faith"
encouraged courts to facilitate market transactions while at the same
time rewarding ethical behavior." In the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, many of Llewellyn's U.C.C. innovations were incorporated
and given broader application.3' With these two pillars of modern
25. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, vols. 1-8 (1950-1951).
26. Reasonable people have differed about the extent to which Corbin actually
forced section 90 down the throats of an unwilling Samuel Williston, et al., but he
participated (as "Special Adviser" and Reporter for the Remedies Chapter) in the
drafting process and certainly had an influence on the product. See generally Grant
Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974); Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom
of Contract, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1529, 1530 & n.l (2002) (reviewing The Fall and
Rise of Freedom of Contract (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)).
27. Professor Scott D. Gerber has recently referred to Arthur Corbin as "the
leading opponent of the parol evidence rule." Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The
Lost Papers of Arthur Linton Corbin, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 605, 638 (2002); see Arthur L.
Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts (1951); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words
and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L. Q. 161 (1965). Although the Restatement
(Second) cites both Williston and Corbin generally as authorities for its parol
evidence rule provisions, it is generally understood to embody Corbin's approach to
that subject rather than Williston's. See generally John D. Calamari and Joseph M.
Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract
Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333, 333, 353 (1967), which in characteristically clear and
persuasive Calamari-and-Perillo fashion explicates the different points of view
obscured behind the apparent semantic agreement between Williston and Corbin, and
demonstrates that the Restatement adopts the Corbin approach, a result applauded
by the authors. Corbin's views "merit adoption because they conform better to the
expectations of contracting parties as to what the law should be."
28. E.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 Harv. L. Rev.
873 (1939).
29. Although married to formidable contract and commercial law teacher and
writer Soia Mentschikoff, Karl Llewellyn persistently referred to the actors in his legal
drama as "business men," a usage which for some of us older folks may conjure up
images of club chairs, brandy, and cigars. E.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Common-Law
Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?, 1941 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 872
(referring to both "business men" and "non-business men").
30. U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-103(1)(b), 2-208 (2002).
31. Compare, e.g., Restatement Second §§ 33, 205, with U.C.C. §§ 2-204, § 2-
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contract law firmly in place, courts could transcend the literal terms of
a signed writing to reach an outcome consonant with the reasonable
expectations of a justifiably aggrieved party, even though that party
labored under a disadvantage in the formation of the agreement at
issue.32
Although these new insights could transform the way in which
contract disputes generally were adjudicated, they only partially
grappled with the problem that by the mid-twentieth century Karl
Llewellyn, Friedrich Kessler and others had identified and explored:
the "contract of adhesion."33 The ever-increasing use of standardized
forms meant that in a vast number of cases, contracts were drafted by
one party and merely "signed onto" by the other, with actual
bargaining being confined to a few variables such as price, quantity,
103(l)(b); compare also Restatement Second §§ 222, 223, with U.C.C. § 2-208.
32. E.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that course of performance and trade usage can trump apparent "plain
meaning" of writing); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169
(Iowa 1975) (finding that "reasonable expectation" of insured can trump apparent
express term of insurance contract); Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 704
A.2d 1321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding that promissory estoppel would
protect lessee against lessor's refusal to honor assurances that lease agreement would
be reached); J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y.
1977) (holding that equity would relieve against failure to give timely notice of lease
renewal to avoid forfeiture).
33. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An
Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704 (1931). In addition to Kessler and Llewellyn,
Professor Todd Rakoff identifies Professors Arthur Leff and David Slawson as the
other most influential writers in the area of adhesion contracts. See Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174, 1206-15
(1983); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970);
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1966). In a recent, remarkably
interesting article, Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser Mansfield report that empirical
testing demonstrates that most consumer form contracts are beyond the
comprehension of the consumers who are required to sign them. Asserting that the
law of consumer contracts is in need of a "reality check" similar to the loosening-up of
contract law that was accomplished for business in the mid-twentieth century, they
conclude as follows:
The realities of today's marketplace ... cry out for a new theory of
consumer contract and statutory law that is based on reality .... Consumer
contract law should not be based on the false notion that by signing one of
these form contracts, the consumer knows of, understands, and has assented
to the terms of the writing. ... By holding onto the freedom-of-contract
doctrine as the main common law component, and using disclosure laws as
the main statutory component of consumer law, the legal system is engaging
in the fiction of a free and informed market, while turning a blind eye to the
realities of the marketplace and to the fact that consumers cannot
understand and do not actually assent to the terms of the consumer contracts
they sign.
Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan. L. & Pol'y
Rev. 233, 266 (2002).
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time and place of delivery, etc. 4 Add to that the power of the
stronger party in many cases to insist on presenting its form on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis, and you have a situation in which
contracting parties typically have no real choice in most of the terms
of the contracts they make-often, as a practical matter, not even the
choice of just saying no. In a contract-law world supposedly based on
the assent of the parties, the contract of adhesion posed a conundrum:
how could there be true assent to terms which one party had not read,
probably would not have understood even if she had, and in any case
would not have been deleted or modified by the other? Of course,
this tension was to some extent already implicit in the classical
system's imposition of a "duty to read," as suggested above, but the
standardized form-particularly as used in mass-market transactions
or other extremely "adhesive" circumstances-exacerbated the
problem by making it nearly impossible in practice to read and
understand (much less to bargain over) most of the terms in the
contract one was making. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of
today's world knows that most mass-transaction contracting takes
place in an environment in which it is clear that, except for a few
"dickered" terms, bargaining is neither expected nor permitted,35 and
even reading the relevant documents is implicitly discouraged.36
Imposing a general "duty to read" is one thing; imposing such a duty
in circumstances where we know it cannot or will not be performed is
Catch-22 with a vengeance.37
34. Llewellyn referred to these as the "dickered" terms, a somewhat antique
phrase that has persisted in the literature of adhesion contracts. Karl Llewellyn, The
Common Law Tradition 370 (1960).
35. See generally Rakoff, supra note 33, at 1220-29.
36. This despite the fact that-as we all know from experience in our daily lives-
many documents include boilerplate language in which the signer asserts that he or
she has read and understands the document being signed.
37. In his 1983 article, Todd Rakoff offers the following clear and convincing
analysis of the adhesion contracting process:
There is little that the individual adherent can do to improve his position.
From the standpoint of ordinary contract law, the obvious failure of
adherents to read and understand form documents appears to be the core
problem involved in the use of contracts of adhesion. On fuller examination,
this failure proves to be merely the most visible symbol of a pervasive and
complex institutional practice. Once the practice comes to exist generally,
the fact that a particular adherent reads and understands the particular form
that he signs is irrelevant. The internal rigidity of the firm will itself be likely
to prevent a knowledgeable adherent's objection to any form term from
generating bargaining behavior, even if the objection is coupled with a threat
to take his trade elsewhere. Yet the effect is magnified when both the
adherent and the drafter know, or at least sense, that other adherents are not
attempting to bargain, for then the request that the firm change its standard
practice becomes mere eccentricity. Similarly, that the adherent reads one
form does not establish that he has read or shopped many others, or that it
would be rational for him to do so. But even if a particular adherent
undertakes that task, the widespread ethos of not shopping for terms
submerges his effort and contributes to the likelihood that, regarding most
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Besides the concepts mentioned above, the U.C.C. in § 2-302
provided one more tool for achieving justice, to be resorted to in cases
where nothing else would serve that purpose: the concept of
"unconscionability." Not a new invention of Llewellyn's but a
recycling of an older equitable notion, "unconscionability" provided a
safety valve for courts seeking to avoid outcomes dictated by contract
language but beyond the level of visceral tolerance.38 And for a while
it did indeed serve that purpose, particularly in cases involving
egregious overreaching by merchants in dealing with consumers, often
ones who were poor or otherwise particularly vulnerable. For a
decade or two, unconscionability decisions studded the case reports
with regularity. 39  Eventually, however, consumer-protective
legislation addressed the most pervasive and recurring types of
overreaching, and the courts' disposition to employ unconscionability
analysis, even in consumer cases, appeared to wane. In non-consumer
cases, even where the parties were distinctly unequal in bargaining
power, its use was never widespread.4"
matters, the terms on all the various forms will be protective of the drafting
parties. Shopping can protect shoppers only when it is a widespread activity.
When contracts of adhesion become commonplace, even the individual who
reads and understands is, and may well perceive himself to be, essentially
helpless. The consumer's experience of modern commercial life is one not of
freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one
of submission to organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose
the organization by which he will be dominated.
Rakoff, supra note 33, at 1228-29 (emphasis added). Professor Rakoff's analysis
could hardly have been better, but his timing could hardly have been worse. His
article marked effectively the last gasp of academic attention to the adhesion contract
issue before the Reagan/free-market/Law-and-Economics tide came in. Symptomatic
of this shift in the cultural ethos is the fact that despite its cogency and high level of
analysis, the West KeyCite shows only one citation of Rakoff's article in secondary
sources in the 1980s, and only seven in the 1990s (mostly in 1998 and 1999). But
beginning with the year 2000, it has (as of this writing) been cited twenty-four times,
usually in the context of discussions of mandatory arbitration or electronic
contracting. With faith in free markets somewhat shaken, and the arrogance and
greed of much of our corporate culture increasingly apparent (to ordinary mortals, if
not to Justices of the Supreme Court), it is hardly surprising that interest in the
adhesion contract problem is being reawakened. With legal scholarship, as with
everything else, what goes around comes around.
38. As with adhesion contracts, and probably most other topics in the contract law
area, unconscionability has its own cast of Usual Suspects: the Leading Case
(Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); the
Leading Article (Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967)); the Statutory Reference (U.C.C. § 2-302
(1989)); the Restatement Section (Restatement Second § 208); and the Leading
Counter-Article (Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & Econ. 293 (1975)). See generally, Calamari & Perillo, supra note 24, §§ 9.37-
9.40.
39. E.g., Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
40. See Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw.
L.J. 1065 (1986). See generally Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A
Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 Hastings L.J. 459 (1995).
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While the rules to be applied in resolving contract disputes were
thus evolving, the institutional modes of doing so were also
undergoing some change. In the early years of the twentieth century,
business enterprises began seeking to avoid the delays and expense
involved in conventional litigation by employing a process that its
proponents claimed could be faster and cheaper, and as good or better
in its outcome, than resorting to the courts: commercial arbitration.
Less hampered by elaborate and perhaps unnecessary rules of
evidence and procedures of discovery, or by archaic and over-formal
rules of substantive law, arbitrators would (it was asserted) be able to
reach decisions that were not only faster and cheaper than those
produced by the courts, but also better, because they were more in
tune with the commercial realities of the dispute. And where rules of
classical contract law often appeared to dictate a zero-sum outcome
with a clear winner and loser, arbitrators might be able to fashion a
compromise decision that would perhaps not completely satisfy either
party, but would give them both something they could live with.
Initially many courts were not enthusiastic about enforcing
arbitration clauses. For whatever combination of reasons, both
English and American courts persisted in regarding agreements to
arbitrate as non-binding, essentially revocable at will by either party.4'
But the general satisfaction of commercial parties with the arbitration
process, and the press of other business on increasingly crowded court
dockets, pushed strongly in favor of supporting consensual arbitration
in commercial cases by making arbitration clauses enforceable despite
a later change of heart by one of the parties. In 1925, Congress passed
the Federal Arbitration Act,42 designed to overcome whatever pockets
of judicial resistance might remain, and to provide a clear path to
arbitration for those who had agreed to settle their disputes by that
means.
43
Summing up, then: by the latter part of the twentieth century, we
find contract law in general transformed by concepts of commercial
reasonableness, good faith and fair dealing, and unconscionability,
permitting-even inviting-the court to bring to bear on the
41. For an example, see United States Asphalt Refinery Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), in which the judge rehearses the various
reasons advanced over the years for refusal to enforce arbitration agreements
between competent parties, finds none of them convincing, but follows the existing
rule anyway. Professor Macneil comments that the cited decision persuaded
advocates of arbitration that the judiciary would remain "permanently and mulishly"
committed to the rule that arbitration agreements remained revocable at the will of
either party. Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation-
Naturalization -Internationalization 30 (1992). Professor Macneil's work recounts
the history of arbitration in America up through 1991.
42. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2002).
43. See generally Macneil, supra note 41. Professor Macneil refers to the FAA as
the "United States Arbitration Act," or "USAA," the name it bore before being
codified in 1947. See Macneil, supra note 41, at 211 n.3.
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resolution of contract disputes both a transactional and a social
perspective. But at the same time we find the adhesion contract
problem increasingly pressing, yet essentially unsolved-tagged, like a
wild bear, for identification purposes, but nevertheless largely free to
roam where it might choose. And we find an increasing resort to
commercial arbitration, supported now by a legal establishment that
previously disdained it, diverting away from the courts countless
disputes, at least some of which would otherwise have been litigated
to decision, perhaps even to appellate review, and possibly to
publication, thereby feeding the common law of contract.
II. POST-MODERN CONTRACT LAW
By the time the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was officially
promulgated in 1979, it probably seemed to many observers that
American contract law had reached a more or less steady state of
predictable, incremental movement in the direction of further
"modernization," following the trends described above. But two
decades later, as the millennium turned, change turned out to be
neither predictable nor always incremental. Both in theory and in
practice, "post-modern" contract law has been neither cohesive nor
coherent.
The '80s and '90s saw a boom in contract scholarship, of which
Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract (1974) was the symbolic
precursor.4 Where many scholars of an earlier era had mostly been
content to parse doctrine and debate the merits and demerits of new
decisions, the post-modern scholars seemed almost indifferent to the
notion of contract law as an existing common-law system. The
relational theorists, practitioners of critical legal studies, and law-and-
economics analysts had many differences, but they did have in
common the vision of a society shaped in important ways by its
contract law.45  This would, however, be a contract law neither
dependent on nor particularly accessible through the study of judicial
decisions-at least not those reached in the existing
"modern/neoclassical" contract universe of the U.C.C. and the
Restatement (Second). Post-modern contract scholarship has been
44. Gilmore, supra note 26. Professor Richard Danzig attributed the enormous
success of Gilmore's book (in terms of the attention it garnered from legal academics)
to the relative drought of theoretical writing about contract law at the time. Richard
Danzig, The Death of Contract and the Life of the Profession: Observations on the
Intellectual State of Legal Academia, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1125 (1977). Not long after
Danzig's piece appeared, a flood of contract scholarship began to inundate the
academic landscape. Be careful what you wish for.
45. And, for that matter, vice versa. Arguably the seminal works in these genres
would be Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691
(1974); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (1972 and
subsequent editions). Readers may have other candidates.
2002]
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voluminous, verbose, and vociferous, but it does not depend for its
existence on an ever-refreshing crop of new decisions. Page after
page of theoretical writing marches inexorably to conclusions
unimpeded by any but the most perfunctory nods in the direction of
case citation.46
While the academy was thus diverted, a new generation of judges-
some drawn from the ranks of law-and-economics theorists, some
merely the politically and economically conservative products of a
conservative era-began trying to steer contract law into a U-turn.
The generally "liberal" cast of mid-twentieth-century contract law was
seen by this new generation (not entirely without justification) as
having been conducive to the pursuit of "social" goals of a somewhat
communitarian or even redistributive nature. 47 But with privatizing
and deregulation the new order of the day, contract law was now to be
regarded as just one of many legal spheres in which the free market
should be allowed to dominate to the greatest extent possible. This
"New Conceptualism" embraced with fervor all the earlier-disdained
incidents of classical formalism-the "duty to read," the "plain
meaning" rule, a vigorous parol evidence rule, a high tolerance for
"puffing," etc.-with the effect, intended or not, of reducing or
eliminating any constraints on the activities of the drafters of form
contracts.
41
Not surprisingly, the adhesion contract problem was now seen by
many judges-up to and including justices of the United States
Supreme Court-as essentially a non-problem. As long as the
adhering party had (at least theoretically, but often only that) a
chance to read and review the contents of the agreement to which he
or she was formally adhering, the minimal amount of "assent"
necessary to the formation of a contract would be present, and
practical considerations often appeared to play no role in the analysis.
Don't like the terms you're offered? (Assuming you could conceivably
have the faintest idea what they are, that is.) Just say no.49 This self-
46. In the spirit of the text, I will refrain from providing supporting citations.
Again, knowledgeable readers will have candidates of their own.
47. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Fort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law
and Distributive Justice. 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980).
48. See generally Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 49
(1995) (noting swing of legal pendulum back toward individualism and untrammeled
"freedom of contract"); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 842 (1999); E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the
1980's: The Top Ten, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 203 (1990) (noting the trend away from
unconscionability, reliance protection, etc., and toward a resurgence of formalism);
Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131
(1995).
49. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Walker
v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138-45 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
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proclaimed "common sense" view of contracting extended not only to
the question of assent beforehand, but even to the addition after-the-
fact of whatever terms the drafter might like to add-so long as these
did not rise (or fall) to the level of full-blown "unconscionability," a
burden of persuasion that is at best difficult, at worst literally
impossible to satisfy.5" At the same time, the appearance and rapid
explosion of on-line selling has added a new dimension to an already
complex problem. Although in one sense it is merely the old form-
contract wine in a new electronic bottle, the "click-through"
contract-requiring an even lower level of manifested assent than the
"signature" of an earlier time-adds new urgency to the plight of the
non-drafting, "adhering" party in a mass-market society."
This renewed judicial deference to the drafter exhibited in recent
years has many examples, but two contractual devices in particular
deserve mention: the forum selection clause and the choice-of-law
clause.52 Short of taking your case out of court altogether, the best
strategic move may be to force your potential adversaries to litigate in
a forum convenient for you (and not incidentally, often inconvenient
for them), with rules of law advantageous to your side.53 Given the
multitude of things that one could choose to haggle over when a
contractual relationship is being created, clauses like these are
(recognizing that forum selection clauses are generally enforceable, but refusing in
this case to enforce the forum selection clause on other grounds). For a devastating
critique of the Supreme Court's analysis of the bargaining in Shute, see Braucher,
supra note 48, at 61-68.
50. E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). This opinion,
which seems to be achieving all the notoriety its author could have wished for, if not
quite all the acquiescence, is the subject of a symposium in the Touro Law Review,
beginning with an article by Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law: Fear
of a Normative Planet?, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1037 (2000).
51. See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002); Margaret Jane
Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125 (2000).
52. The newly-promulgated revised U.C.C. Article 1 would substantially amend
the prior choice of law rules, in former U.C.C. § 1-105, substituting in new § 1-301 a
provision that provides for consumers some protection against being deprived of
consumer-protective rules of law, while at the same time substantially broadening the
power of a contractual document to choose in non-consumer cases virtually any state
or, in some cases, foreign country as the jurisdiction whose rules of law apply. See
Fred H. Miller, Intrastate Choice of Applicable Law in the UCC, 54 SMU L. Rev. 525
(2001); Kathleen Patchel and Boris Auerbach, The Article 1 Revision Process, 54
SMU L. Rev. 603, 611-613 (2001).
53. See Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002),
where a unanimous court blessed a choice of law clause restricting the plaintiff to suit
in Virginia, one of only two states that does not provide for class action suits. The
arbitration clause was available in a "scroll-down" form on the defendant's website,
and was found "in the final section of the main text of the Agreement, which, when
printed out, totals thirteen pages (including two lengthy appendices)." The court also
noted that many consumers "presumably read the Agreement [if at all?] in a scroll
box on their computer monitors, where only a small portion of the document is visible
at any one time." Id. at 1010 (alteration added).
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unlikely to be singled out as deal-breaking or even bargaining-chip
points, even if the drafter of a proposed contract is in fact amenable to
bargaining at all. So if a dispute should later develop about the
quality of the goods or services provided by the drafter of the
agreement, any potential plaintiffs are likely to find themselves in
territory both distant and unfamiliar-a pleasant prospect on a
tropical cruise, perhaps, but not so pleasant in the aftermath of a
disastrous one.
Even more than those devices, however, mandatory arbitration
clauses have become not merely favorites but darlings of the courts.
The growth of commercial arbitration has in recent years burgeoned
into the widespread inclusion of arbitration clauses not only in
contracts between commercial enterprises (evenly matched or
otherwise) but in a host of other types of agreements as well, such as
those between health-care providers (or insurers) and their patients,55
between merchants of goods and services and their customers,5 6
between banks and their customers," and between employers and
their employees." The United States Supreme Court,59 followed
54. See Share, 499 U.S. 585; Walker, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1135. In the latter case, a suit
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA),
District Judge Thelton Henderson first decided that the choice of forum clause
requiring plaintiffs to sue in Florida was enforceable, following Shite. Walker v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Subsequently he
granted a motion for reconsideration, and ruled that disabled California plaintiffs
(who had boarded defendant's ship, the ironically named "Holiday," in California)
could present their claims in his court in California. Walker, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1135.
Judge Henderson's second opinion is remarkable for its attention to the hardship that
the disabled plaintiffs would face in traveling to Florida (and also for its readiness to
confess error in the original granting of defendant's motion for dismissal), but shares
with his first opinion the same indifference to the realities of adhesion bargaining
exhibited by cases like Shite. Compare Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-
89, with Walker, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. The case was ultimately settled on a basis
that not only provided some compensation to the plaintiffs and substantial
compensation to their attorney but also facilitated the settlement of another suit
pending against the same cruise line, in turn leading ultimately to renovation of the
defendant's ships to accommodate disabled passengers. See generally Matthew Gluck,
Walker Couldn't; The Holiday Wasn't (unpublished paper written for seminar course
at Hastings College of Law, on file with Fordham Law Review).
55. E.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997)
(discussing arbitration clause in an agreement with an HMO).
56. E.g., 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
57. E.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
58. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
59. See the following United States Supreme Court cases (in chronological order):
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967) (finding
that FAA was based on full reach of interstate commerce power; charge of fraud in
inducement of contract arbitrable unless fraud directed specifically to arbitration
clause); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24-25
(1983) ("[The FAA establishesl liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements .... jA]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
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loyally, and for the most part enthusiastically, by the lower federal
courts,6 has made the strong preference for enforcement of
arbitration clauses a matter of federal preemption, so broadly and
firmly expressed as to make it nearly impossible for even those state
judges or state legislatures who might be so moved to exercise any
restraining influence at all.6
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (holding that the FAA is binding on state courts and
the California statute requiring judicial resolution of claims preempted by the FAA);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985)
(holding that federal antitrust claims are arbitrable under the FAA; arbitration clause
upheld); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding
customers' claims against brokerage house arbitrable, both under Securities Exchange
Act and under RICO); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding that federal age discrimination claims are arbitrable in absence of clear
showing of congressional intent to the contrary); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (finding that Congress intended the FAA to extend to
full reach of commerce power and declining invitation to overrule Southland);
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA preempts
state statute imposing formal requirements on arbitration agreements); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. -Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that the risk that plaintiff
with claim under Truth In Lending Act would be prevented from pursuing claim by
costs of arbitration not sufficient to avoid arbitration in absence of specific showing of
prohibitive costs); Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001)
(stating that FAA's exception for employees "engaged in commerce" would be
narrowly construed, limited to persons actually engaged in "transportation"). See
generally Harding, supra note 7; Sternlight, supra note 7. One recent case is an
exception to this otherwise uninterrupted march toward wider and stronger
application of the FAA: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), in which the Court (6-3; opinion per Stevens, J.) held that
the EEOC could pursue both injunctive and damage relief based on asserted violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act despite the fact that the employee in question
had signed an agreement that would preclude him as an individual from asserting such
claims against the defendant.
60. E.g., Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
61. E.g., Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688 (finding that FAA preempts state law
requiring arbitration clause to be conspicuous on first page of contract); Southland,
465 U.S. at 16 (holding that FAA preempts state law voiding arbitration clause). The
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration attitude in the latter case may if anything have been
hardened by a remarkable concurring opinion below in the Montana Supreme Court
by Justice Trieweiler (who also wrote the majority's opinion upholding the Montana
statute as consistent with the FAA and federal jurisprudence thereunder), in which he
attacked the arrogance of federal judges and defended the ability and the right of
Montana to police its own affairs, arbitration-wise, a remarkable example of
principled courage or pigheadedness, depending on your point of view. Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939-41 (Mont. 1994). I have previously had occasion to note
(favorably) Justice Trieweiler's forthrightness in another case, Sherrodd, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 815 P.2d 1135, 1138-39 (Mont. 1991) (Trieweiler, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's reasoning in finding that the parol evidence
rule prevents showing of fraud in the inducement). See Knapp, supra note 19, at 1320-
30. In a more recent decision, the Montana Supreme Court has again demonstrated
its independent streak. In Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 00-507, 2002 WL
1293057, at *9, *11 (Mont. June 13, 2002) (Trieweiler, J., writing for the court), the
court held that an investor (an "elderly widow" with "no apparent special expertise in
the stock market") was not bound by the arbitration clauses in her contracts with
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This pro-arbitration stance of the courts-widely regarded as going
far beyond anything clearly mandated by the FAA itself 2-has
defendant brokerage house, because they were adhesion contracts, the defendant
owed her a fiduciary duty to explain the effect of the arbitration clauses, and she had
failed to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of her fundamental right under the
Montana constitution to a jury trial on her various claims. In a separate concurrence,
joined by three other members of the court including Justice Trieweiler, Justice
Nelson explored at length the issue of waiver of trial by jury, asserting that the United
States Supreme Court had never directly ruled on the jury waiver issue addressed by
the Montana court in Kloss. Id. at *11. In a concluding footnote, Justice Nelson
conceded that there may be "little point railing against the present state of the law
'favoring' arbitration," but that in light of the history of the FAA, Justices Scalia and
Thomas in their assertions that Southland should be overruled are "dead right." Id. at
*14, n.3; see infra note 62.
62. See the dissenting opinions in chronological order written by the following
Justices of the Supreme Court in the indicated cases: Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407
(Black, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart); Southland, 465 U.S.
at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justices Brennan and in part by Marshall); Shearson, 482 U.S. at 242 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (joined in part by Justices Brennan and Marshall); id. at 268 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Marshall); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justice Scalia). While the issues presented in the various cited
cases differed, and the cited opinions (some dissenting, some concurring in part) went
to different aspects of the FAA's construction, it seems nevertheless fair to say that all
the named Justices have at one point or another expressed disagreement with the
Court's aggressively expansive course in this area. The careful reader will have noted
that this roster includes not only some revered prior members of the Court, now
deceased, but also a majority of the members of the present Court: Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas. The catch is that
Justice O'Connor, without recanting her original view that Southland was wrongly
decided, concurred in Allied-Bruce on the basis purely of stare decisis. 513 U.S. at 284.
After first noting that the Court's ruling in Allied-Bruce would "displace many state
statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers," id. at 282, Justice O'Connor went
on to reiterate views she had earlier expressed about the Court's construction of the
FAA over the years:
I continue to believe that Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration
Act to apply in state courts, and that this Court has strayed far afield in
giving the Act so broad a compass .... [O]ver the past decade, the Court has
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining Congressional intent with respect to
the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its
own creation.... I have no doubt that Congress could enact ... a federal
arbitration statute that displaces most state arbitration laws. But I also have
no doubt that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute.
Id. at 283. Nevertheless, she went on, Southland is over ten years old, many cases
have relied on it, and contracts have "undoubtedly" been made in reliance on it.
Though "faulty," it has not proved "unworkable." Id. at 283-84.
In his dissent in Allied-Bruce, after noting that attorneys general of twenty
states had there joined in requesting the Court to overrule Southland, Justice Scalia
provided an effective response to Justice O'Connor:
I do not believe that proper application of stare decisis prevents correction of
the mistake. Adhering to Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized
eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of
disputes. Abandoning it does not impair reliance interests to a degree that
justifies this evil. Primary behavior is not affected: No rule of conduct is
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proved so strong that it not only trumps most state-level attempts at
resistance, it also overcomes other policies that one might have
thought would enjoy stronger judicial support. Although the Act
appears to pay deference to the need for a real "contract" to
arbitrate, 3 the federal courts have been particularly insensitive to the
peculiar problems of adhesion contracting.' They have also been
relatively indifferent to arguments that the right to a jury trial
deserves judicial protection against unwitting or unwilling "waiver,"
even though many of the cases sent to arbitration would otherwise
retroactively changed, but only (perhaps) the forum in which violation is to
be determined and remedied. I doubt that many contracts with arbitration
clauses would have been foregone, or entered into only for significantly
higher remuneration, absent the Southland guarantee.
Id. at 284-85. In the future, Justice Scalia concluded, he would not dissent from
judgments relying on Southland, but at the same time would "stand ready to join four
other justices in overruling it." Id. at 285. On the general lack of support in the
statute or its history for the Supreme Court's finding of a come-hell-or-highwater pro-
arbitration policy in the FAA, see Alderman, Brafford, Harding, Harrington,
Schwartz, supra note 7. For a full-scale critique of the Court's "bizarre
transformation of American arbitration law" in Southland, see Macneil, supra note
41, at 139-47; see also supra note 61 (discussing Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co.).
63. The FAA provides that arbitration agreements may be attacked "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000).
64. From Green Tree Financial Corp. -Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000),
to Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002), Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), and Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F.
Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998), one senses in the courts' opinions not merely a
willingness but an eagerness to proclaim both to the adherent in that case and to the
legal community in general that, when it comes to contracts, the law of the land is the
law of the jungle: Might indeed does make Right. It is impossible to tell whether the
judges are truly as naive as they profess to be about the realities of bargaining in the
real world, or whether they just don't care. Of course, there are federal judges and
then there are federal judges. For a salutary corrective, see the opinion of Senior
District Judge John T. Nixon in Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771
(M.D. Tenn. 2002), holding that plaintiff employee with a sexual harassment claim
against her former employer (a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee) would not be
remitted to arbitration pursuant to a signed arbitration agreement. In the course of
his discussion of why the plaintiff's contract was an adhesion contract, and
unconscionable for a variety of reasons, Judge Nixon makes, in a footnote, the
following observation:
This Court is aware of the difficulties facing employers, who must deal with
many employment discrimination claims, many of which are ultimately
found to be without merit. The Court is also mindful of the large number of
employment discrimination cases in the federal court system. However, this
Court will not overlook the clear unconscionability of these arbitration
agreements in order to achieve greater efficiency or convenience. This issue
is simply too important. These cases do not "clog" the federal docket-they
belong in federal court. Employees must not be forced to either forgo
employment or forgo their right to a day in court, and Courts must not use
the perceived problems associated with employment discrimination to
prevent employees, and society at large, from vindicating the rights that
Congress enshrined in the Civil Rights Acts.
Id. at 779 n.7.
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have been tried to a jury." Perhaps most surprisingly, the Supreme
Court and many lower courts have-after initial indication to the
contrary 66-been receptive to the notion that claims based on the
statutory right to be free of various types of invidious discrimination
can be forced into arbitration, despite the clear public interest in
seeing those rights effectively vindicated in a public forum.7 If even
the right to litigate claims of racial discrimination or sexual
harassment will be deemed to have been waived by unintended or
effectively unavoidable "agreements," it follows that under the
present legal regime the right to litigate a mere breach of contract
claim in court is going to receive little or no protection from attrition
by adhesion.
Your logical follow-up question, however, may be: okay, suppose all
that is true, so what? Why does that matter? Given the undisputed
fact that for a large part of the twentieth century an increasing volume
of commercial disputes was voluntarily diverted by the parties from
public courtrooms into private chambers of arbitration, thereby
relieving the strain on overburdened courts without visibly damaging
either the commercial life of the country or the American legal
system, why should the recent expansion of arbitration into these
other areas be a cause for concern?
My response, elaborated below, is that it does indeed matter, for
several reasons: the effect on the parties to contract disputes, the
effect on the development of the law of contract, and the effect on
American society as a whole.
III. THE FUTURE OF CONTRACT LAW?
In this section of my discussion, I will suggest the negative effects
that seem to me likely to follow if the current enthronement of private
65. See generally Sternlight, supra note 7, at 56-59 (discussing the Supreme Court's
development over the years of a four-factor balancing test for waiver of constitutional
rights, and suggesting that at least some of its holdings in the arbitration area would
have gone the other way had the Court consistently applied its own case law
regarding waiver of the right to a trial by jury in civil cases); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) (discussing the types of
cases going to arbitration and cases going to litigation, and the impact this has on any
empirical study of award amounts); supra note 61 (discussing Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co.).
66. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) (holding that an
adverse arbitrator's decision does not prevent plaintiff from pursuing a remedy under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
67. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (t991) (finding that an
employee's claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act is subject to
arbitration); Farac v. Permanente Med. Group, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that employee's Title VII claim was subject to arbitration, and stating that
the prior holding in the Ninth Circuit was effectively overruled by Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).
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arbitration continues unabated into the coming years of the new
century. Some of these, stemming from the nature of the arbitration
process itself, have been extensively documented by other
commentators, but they seem to me to bear reiteration here; others
have to do more with the general effect of shunting disputes from a
public forum into a private one.
Arbitration has been enthusiastically touted over the years as being
faster, cheaper, and perhaps better in substance than litigation as a
means of resolving commercial disputes.68 Presumably the legions of
contracting parties who have voluntarily employed the process over
the years must agree that it has at least some of these advantages, or
they would not have chosen it over adjudication by a court. But even
where parties of equal bargaining power are concerned, arbitration is
not costless. Where the parties are unequal, those costs taken
together may make it more difficult or even impossible for the weaker
party to obtain a just resolution of her claims.
Arbitration is, first of all, not free. Commercial arbitrators are paid
for their services, as, of course, are judges. However, judges'
remuneration comes out of everyone's taxes (yours, mine and those of
the parties as well), while arbitrators' fees must come out of the
pockets of the parties.69 Two disputants with equally deep pockets
may gladly pay the cost of arbitrators' fees as a trade-off for speedier
resolution of their dispute. There are many reasons why time is
money, particularly to those who have plenty of the latter and never
enough of the former. But where the claimant is an individual buyer
of goods or services, an employee, a health-care patient, a bank
customer, or even a small business attempting to pursue a claim
against a much larger one, the cost of arbitrators' fees may be
prohibitive. Courts entertaining challenges to arbitration have
steadfastly declined to entertain the notion that imposing arbitration
on an unwilling party could be unconscionable per se,7" but in at least
68. See Speidel, supra note 7:
A basic assumption is that arbitration, controlled by the parties and
managed by an experienced, impartial institution, is quicker, less formal, and
less costly than adjudication in court. It is a confidential procedure that
strives to achieve a fair, final outcome between the parties without setting a
precedent, for future disputes.
Id. at 1070. See also Alderman, supra note 7, at 1243-44; Brafford, supra note 7, at
334-35; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 69-81.
69. See Alderman, supra note 7, at 1249-53. See generally Martin Domke, Domke
on Commercial Arbitration, § 4:42 (Willner ed. 2001). See the discussion of
arbitration costs that would have been borne by plaintiffs in various cases, in State ex
rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 281 n.13 (W. Va. 2002) (stating that costs range
from hundreds to thousands of dollars in filing fees, daily hearing fees, room rental,
etc.).
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, along with other cases cited therein, is generally
regarded as foreclosing any argument that arbitration per se could be unconscionable.
Courts that find arbitration clauses unenforceable (wholly or in part) because of
unconscionability do so by identifying the presence of unconscionability that is both
2002]
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some cases courts have been persuaded by well-marshaled evidence
that the procedures applicable under the arbitration agreement at
issue would be unconscionably expensive for a particular claimant.7'
In some cases, the choice of arbitration carries another cost for an
unwilling plaintiff, difficult to quantify but real nonetheless: loss of the
right to a trial by jury. It is, I believe, a commonplace observation
among knowledgeable lawyers that a plaintiff whose case could have
been tried to a jury in a courtroom suffers an immediate and
substantial economic loss if her case is shunted into arbitration: a loss
in settlement value. 2 Of course, like most sermons, this plays one way
to the choir and another to the nonbelievers outside the church. To
those who see the legal system as tilted at almost every point against
those with few resources and in favor of those with many, a plaintiff's
chance to tell her story to a jury may seem one of the few gleams of
egalitarian hope in a darkly plutocratic world. On the other hand,
those who deeply distrust both juries and lawyers (well, plaintiffs'
lawyers, anyway) will seize on this as making their point for them-
jurors are likely to be bleeding-heart populists, who, moved by
unscrupulous ambulance-chasers, will gladly give away the store, as
long it is somebody else's. Assuming the truth lies somewhere in the
middle, it still follows that many plaintiffs who could and would
receive substantial compensation for their claims, either from a jury at
trial or from a defendant fearing such an outcome, will receive much
less-either in award or in settlement-if denied access to a jury.73
Moreover, denial of access to a court of law in most cases means
exactly that-denial of access not merely to a court, or even to a jury,
but to the law itself. With a forum-selection clause shunting the case
to a distant courtroom, or a choice-of-law clause applying the rules of
a foreign jurisdiction, there is at least the prospect of finding and
arguing and getting the benefit of some rule of law, even if not the one
that plaintiff would have preferred. But arbitrators in most cases are
not bound to follow the law, nor are their decisions appealable to a
court of law for any but the most egregious of defects. Mere failure to
follow the law is not such a defect.74 The result is that whatever the
"procedural" (generally, often by finding the contract to be one of adhesion) and
"substantive" in one or more particular respect. See also infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
71. E.g., Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 265; O'Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co., No.
80453, 2002 WL 1454074, at *5 (Ohio App. July 3, 2002) (holding that proven minimal
cost of arbitration coupled with remedy limitation in contract rendered arbitration
unconscionable in the circumstances).
72. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 60 ("While the jury is probably still out on this issue,
there is a general perception that arbitrators give smaller awards than juries.").
73. Jeffrey Robert White, Mandatory Arbitration: A Growing Threat, Trial, July
1999, at 32, 34 ("Empirical studies are sketchy... but the data support what defense
and plaintiff counsel already know: Arbitration of tort claims results in far less
frequent liability and substantially lower awards than jury verdicts.").
74. The FAA lists several grounds on which a court might vacate an arbitrator's
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rules of law may be, arbitrators are not bound to follow them, and
their handiwork is subject to only the most perfunctory of judicial
oversight. Arbitrators of course may choose to follow the law-
nothing requires them not to-but if they do, it's not because they
have any obligation to do so, and it's not something that a litigant or
her attorney can count on going in. Knowledgeable attorneys may
have some sense of the approach that an arbitration panel is likely to
take to a given type of case. Still, the arbitrators bring their own
"law" with them, and they take it with them when they leave.
Another respect in which a party forced into arbitration may be
denied the benefit of otherwise applicable rules of law is with respect
to the remedies available. In an ordinary breach of contract suit,
damages under conventional rules of law may be substantial. If the
plaintiff's claim sounds in tort, or under a statute, a successful
litigant's award might also include punitive damages, or statutorily
mandated damages, possibly including attorney fees. And many types
of claims-contractual or otherwise-could, under the rules of civil
procedure, be combined in class actions, effectively making it
economically feasible to pursue aggregated claims where it would not
be to assert them singly. Some arbitration schemes negate the
possibility of punitive damages or other damages of various types;75
some expressly exclude class actions.76 Judges are not in accord as to
whether these limitations on the arbitrators' power are defects
substantial enough to invalidate an arbitration clause as being
unconscionable; some courts have so held,77 but many others
disagree."5 Particularly in mass-market transactions, where a potential
defendant makes many similar contracts involving relatively small
amounts, protection from class actions is, effectively, insulation from
any accountability whatsoever for wrongful conduct."
The cumulative effect of the above costs may result in another kind
of cost, and a potentially devastating one-denial of access to counsel.
award, generally involving fraud, corruption, evident bias or misconduct on the part
of the arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). There is some case law permitting a
challenge on the ground of "manifest disregard" of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 436 (1953). This concept is not well-developed in the case law but apparently
involves not mere error of law, but a conscious refusal to follow some clearly
governing rule or principle. See generally Domke, supra note 69, § 34.08. An award
may also not be upheld if it is "arbitrary and capricious" or "completely irrational."
Id. §§ 34.10, 34.11.
75. See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Bellsouth Mobility LLC v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 281 n.13.
76. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Adkins v. Labor
Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. W.Va. 2001).
77. See, e.g., the cases cited in supra note 75; see also Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902.
78. See, e.g., Adkins, 185 F. Supp. 2d 628.
79. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2000).
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Once in a blue moon, an individual litigant may be able to represent
himself effectively," ' but whether in court or in arbitration, ordinary
people ordinarily need attorneys to protect their interests." The
prospect of limited damage awards, unavailability of the class-action
procedure, even the possibility that an unsuccessful plaintiff might be
assessed all or part of the defendants' attorney fees-all these may
reduce the potential value of the plaintiff's case to a point where it is
economically impossible for her to obtain the services of an attorney. 2
The immediately preceding discussion has focused on the effect that
mandatory arbitration can have on the parties to a dispute. This is,
however, only one consequence of the choice between arbitration and
litigation. From the point of view of one concerned in an institutional
way about the development of contract law, wholesale substitution of
arbitration for litigation also has other consequences that are perhaps
unintended, but nevertheless undesirable. Somewhat paradoxically,
these have to do both with the extent to which prior court decisions
are binding on courts in future disputes, and also with the extent to
which they are not.
In our Anglo-American legal culture, parties to a legal dispute can
ordinarily expect any court that hears their case to deal with it in the
same way that similar cases have been dealt with in the past either by
that court or by higher courts in the same system. This observation
would most obviously apply to disputes governed by the "common
law" (which is nothing but an aggregate of past court decisions), but it
also applies to cases governed by statutes, to the extent that those
statutes have been the subject of prior court construction.
"Precedent" is considered to be controlling partly because the
decisions of higher courts are deemed to be binding on lower courts in
the same jurisdiction, but its force also flows from the principle of
stare decisis, by which even the high court of a jurisdiction is
considered obligated as a general rule to follow its own past decisions
in later cases not materially distinguishable. To the extent that a given
dispute would otherwise have been decided in a court governed by
80. See, as an example, Donovan v. RRL Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), in which lawyer/plaintiff Donovan attempted to hold defendant car
dealer to a mistaken price stated in a newspaper ad, based on a combination of
common law principles and consumer-protective statute. Donovan lost, but given
that he won in two out of three locver courts and persuaded two judges of the
California Supreme Court, it must be conceded that he represented himself
effectively, even if not successfully. Id. at 834.
81. Plaintiffs in small claims courts may be permitted or even required to appear
on their own behalf. Alderman points out that small claims courts may also be less
expensive for a plaintiff than arbitration, and yet an arbitration clause may also
preclude recourse to that court. Alderman, supra note 7, at 1250.
82. It may be that the costs of litigation, including attorney fees, would generally
be lower in arbitration than in litigation. See St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 7-9. But if
awards are also seen as likely to be lower, the net effect of lack of access to the courts
may be less availability of legal representation. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 60.
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those principles, its diversion to arbitration means that precedent and
stare decisis are no longer controlling in its resolution, as indicated
earlier. It also means, however, that once the case is decided by the
arbitrators, it will furnish no precedent by which future decision-
makers-whether judges or other arbitrators-will be guided. Past
decisions in arbitration furnish no reliable guide to the present and
present decisions serve as no reliable guide to the future. They
neither follow the law, nor contribute to it.
There is another characteristic of litigation in the Anglo-American
system, however, much less frequently manifested but perhaps of
equal importance: the ability to depart from precedent. Although
every court is deemed to be bound by the decisions of a higher court,
any court is, in principle, free to override its own past decisions in
situations where for whatever reason such departure appears
appropriate. This inherent power in a court to overrule its own prior
decisions is by convention exercised sparingly, but all courts up to and
including the United States Supreme Court can, and on occasion do
change course in this manner, fashioning in the process a new rule to
be applied in similar future cases. This ability to innovate where
necessary saves the system of precedent and stare decisis from being a
straight jacket, allowing room for the law to breathe and develop over
time as knowledge, custom, and mores evolve. Where cases are
decided by courts of law, in reported decisions, a substantial change of
direction by the decision-makers will be a matter of public record.
Since arbitration decisions do not have this public quality, neither a
tendency to follow past decisions nor a resolve to depart from them
would be a matter of public record. So neither kind of law-the
precedent-respecting or the precedent-rejecting -is thereby created. 3
This is not to suggest that the widespread use of arbitration by
willing parties has thus far been or indeed is likely to be fatal to the
common law of contract, even though it may have diminished the flow
of contract decisions over the past half-century or so. After all,
disputants who choose to arbitrate might instead have chosen simply
to settle their disputes on their own, without resort to any external
decision-maker. As a practical matter, of course, we all know without
any need for empirical verification that the vast majority of contract
disputes in fact are settled before they reach a court of law, even a
trial court.8 4 If that were not so, the legal system could not function.
83. If arbitrators were required to prepare written decisions, this would facilitate
judicial review of awards. See Rohlik, supra note 7; Speidel, supra note 7, at 1089-91.
84. To put it a bit more hyperbolically:
On any given day, the number of individual contracts entered into in even
one of the United States must number in the millions. Of that huge total, a
tiny fraction ... will eventually give rise to a dispute between the parties. Of
these relatively few disputes, the overwhelming majority will be resolved
without even coming to the threshold of a court .... The number of written
opinions on which the common law is based ... is to the commercial life of
2002]
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But of course there is always the chance that settlement negotiations
will not bear fruit, and the parties will, for whatever combination of
reasons, litigate to the bitter end, producing a judicial decision that
joins its predecessors as part of the aggregate common law of
contract." If all contract disputes which the parties could not settle
between themselves had to be submitted to arbitration for resolution,
rather than to a court of law, the common law of contract would cease
to be a living organism. 6 It would become merely an historical relic, a
legal King Tut in its elaborately detailed Restatement (Second)
sarcophagus, a ruler to be exhumed and displayed-even admired,
perhaps-but not obeyed. This might not be altogether a bad thing,
but it would mean that our legal system in this respect at least had
become vastly different from the one we had (or imagined ourselves
to have) for the past century or so.
Until now, I have been depicting what may be seen as the
shortcomings of arbitration, either for the parties to a particular
dispute or as a component of a larger legal system. Paintings created
with a broad brush are often impressionistic, and the scene the artist
thinks he has created may not be recognizable to all viewers. Those
more intimately familiar than I with the details of arbitration in action
might find much to quarrel with in the picture of arbitration sketched
by the preceding few paragraphs. They might, for instance, contend
that arbitration panels in fact are usually disposed to follow the law as
they understand it, whatever their power to do otherwise, and that
when they fail to follow the law, it is usually only to reach a fairer
outcome than the existing rules of law would permit. Those observers
might also claim that attorneys who practice frequently in arbitration
proceedings actually are reasonably able to predict the arbitrators'
our country as is a sandcastle, not just to the beach on which it sits, but to the
globe of which that beach is a part.
Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 9, at 17.
85. E.g., Joyner v. Adams, 387 S.E.2d 235 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (three trials, three
appeals); see Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 9, at 423-31.
86. Of course, even the voluntary settlement of a private lawsuit diverts the
resolution of that dispute away from the public process, and there may be social costs
to that. See the well-known discussion by Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale
L.J. 1073 (1984), suggesting that there is a public function even in private dispute
resolution that may be lost when cases are shunted out of the public litigation system.
And there can be other social costs as well: the pernicious effect of settlement
agreements that include secrecy requirements which deny similarly situated plaintiffs
access to relevant information (particularly where product safety or potentially
criminal conduct such as pedophilia is at issue) has recently become a focus of judicial
concern. See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2002, at AI. My thesis here is much more modest. When cases
are diverted out of the judicial system involuntarily-i.e., by what we have come to
call "mandatory arbitration"-rather than by voluntary (post-dispute) submission, we
all pay a social cost. For a cogent discussion of the distinction between pre-dispute
submission to arbitration and settlement of existing claims, see Schwartz, supra note
7, at 114-20.
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reactions to arguments of various types, perhaps as much so as with
many judges. And certainly many proponents of mandatory
arbitration would argue that I have given far too short a shrift to the
degree to which unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys-armed with jury
access and class-action capability-are able to play the litigation
game, extorting (in effect) large settlements where small ones (or
none at all) would have been more appropriate. 7 In their eyes,
mandatory arbitration may be just another "common sense" means of
getting an out-of-control system back under control, so that business
can get, well, back to business.
At this point, though, the arguments become inescapably political.
Each side rests more on principle than on empirically demonstrable
fact, and probably more on faith than on principle. For some, it is an
article of faith that contract law has little or nothing to do with
morality or fairness or even justice, to the extent that any of those
terms means anything other than enforcing the agreements which one
of the parties has proposed and the other party has in form agreed to.
This faith may stem from adherence to a particular intellectual
scheme of economic analysis, from a libertarian cast of mind, or
simply from a sort of economic Darwinism: parties with economic
power have it because they earned it, and by the same token are
entitled to use it to get more. From this point of view, if the drafters
of agreements choose for whatever reason to opt out of the public
legal arena, and to impose on all who deal with them a private rather
than public method of resolving any disputes that might flow from
their dealings, that's their privilege. Nobody is hurt by that, and we all
benefit from the courts' greater ability to deal with the remaining
mass of litigation that is, indisputably, public in nature-criminal
prosecutions, other public-law enforcement, and tort litigation
between strangers (i.e., parties not already in a contractual
relationship)." If the price of doing business with Enterprise X is to
submit to privatized contract law, then the only issue worth
considering is whether the potential gain to be realized from dealing
with Enterprise X is worth that price. You either buy that contract or
you do not. Either way, it is your choice.
Here, then, is where lines are drawn, and the difference between
ordinary voluntary arbitration and "mandatory" arbitration becomes
crucial. Parties who jointly and voluntarily agree that arbitration
87. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 7, at 1258-59 & nn.93-95.
88. Of course this somewhat overstates the extent to which issues of public law do
in fact remain in the public forum; the Supreme Court is quite content to let them,
too, disappear into arbitral oblivion. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). But
see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279
(2002) (holding that an agreement between employer and employee does not bar the
EEOC from pursuing independent judicial relief).
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represents a preferable means of resolving their future disputes may
thereby lessen the flow of common-law precedent, but of course they
could have done the same thing by simply settling their disputes short
of litigation. Moreover, by so agreeing, they do save the rest of us the
cost of whatever public resources would have been consumed in
resolving their disputes. Good for them.Y That, however, is not
mandatory arbitration. When a party with the power to do so imposes
on all those who deal with it a surrender of access to the public-court
system, as a price of doing business, this is truly mandatory
arbitration. Why "mandatory"? Because the parties upon whom the
arbitration clause is imposed are unwilling or unable to resist. In some
cases, this will stem from lack of knowledge of what is happening until
it is too late.9" But in most cases it will also be a function of the
market power of the stronger party, imposing its will on the weaker
one: an ordinary employee, a health-care patient, a consumer of goods
or services, a small business dealing with a large one.' As a practical
89. Or maybe not. See Fiss, supra note 86.
90. For example:
The Burches did not receive a copy of the HBW's terms until after Double
Diamond had paid the premium to enroll the Burch home in the warranty
program and almost four months after they closed escrow on their home.
Double Diamond told the Burches that the HBW's issuance was
"automatic" and offered extra protection for their home, when in fact the
warranty limited their protection under Nevada law. The Burches did not
have an opportunity to read the one-page "application" form, or the thirty-
one-page HBW booklet, or to view the HBW video before signing the
"application." The arbitration clause was located on page six of the HBW
booklet, after five pages of material only relevant to persons residing outside
of Nevada. The Burches were not sophisticated consumers, they did not
understand the HBW's terms, and the HBW's disclaimers were not
conspicuous. Under these circumstances, the Burches did not have a
meaningful opportunity to decide if they wanted to agree to the HBW's
terms, including its arbitration provision.
Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. of Nevada, 49 P.3d 647, 650 (Nev. 2002) (citations
omitted).
91. For example:
McCoy [plaintiff file clerk who claimed he had been improperly terminated
by defendant law firm] submitted a declaration in opposition to the motion
to compel arbitration, stating he signed the agreement... because he "was
told that if I did not sign the agreement, that I would be fired. I was given
no choice but to do it." He also declared the cost of the arbitration "will be
a severe hardship to me."
.... The Firm acknowledges McCoy was required to agree to arbitration
or lose his job: "If [McCoyl did not want to sign an arbitration agreement
with Ithe Firm], he could have found employment at another firm." But the
Firm does not see this as a problem ... land] argues that making an
arbitration agreement a condition of employment does not ipso facto render
it procedurally unconscionable. We disagree.
McCoy v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 506-07 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. denied
and ordered to not be officially published (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2001). The California
"depublication" process is discussed and defended by then Associate Justice (later
Professor) Joseph R. Grodin in The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme
Court, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 514 (1984). The process has been attacked as a kind of covert
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matter, arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are not and cannot be
the subject of bargaining. Judges who insist that they should be are
either disingenuous or woefully naive about the ways of the world.92
If permitted to remove all its potential disputes from the public
arena, the party with irresistible contracting power will thus have
deprived the courts of what I and many others would assert is their
natural and appropriate function in cases involving adhesion contract
disputes: to redress that imbalance of power. For decades, one legal
commentator after another has made the point that adhesion
contracts should not be regarded as sacred cows of the law, but rather
as dangerous animals, likely to do harm unless confined and tamed.93
Of course, even the public courts do not always systematically protect
those incapable of protecting themselves from egregious overreaching
by the economically powerful. However, the arbitration system as it
presently exists is for all the reasons discussed above unlikely to do so
at all, systematically or otherwise. Acting in tandem, stimulus-and-
response fashion with democratically elected legislatures, vigilant
courts can do much to protect individuals and less powerful
enterprises from corporate overreaching, and to alert the legal
apparatus to systemic abuses of power.94 But they cannot exercise
that function if access to the courts is denied to those who need it
most.
The mandatory arbitration clause is thus sui generis, unlike any
other boilerplate provision that a stronger party might impose in a
take-it-or-leave-it contract. Every other provision-even a choice-of-
law or forum selection clause-can at least be tested by some court of
law, where the conflicting claims of freedom of contract and freedom
from economic oppression can be publicly weighed and assessed.
Enforcement of the mandatory arbitration clause, however, means
that neither the arbitration clause nor any other portion of that
adhesion contract can be so tested. Left unchecked, mandatory
arbitration will effectively "solve" the adhesion contract problem, to
be sure, but in much the same way as the Austrians in the 1938
Anschluss solved their Nazi problem: by handing over the keys to the
city.
law-making. See Stephen R. Barnett, Depublication Deflating:. The California
Supreme Court's Wonderful Law-Making Machine Begins to Self-Destruct, 45
Hastings L.J. 519 (1994); Steven B. Katz, California's Curious Practice of "Pocket
Review," 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 385 (2001).
92. See Rakoff, supra note 33, at 1227-29; White & Mansfield, supra note 33, at
266.
93. See supra note 33.
94. See generally Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 9, at 680-83. On the general
growth of the "equity" side of contract law over the course of the mid-twentieth
century, see Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future-and Vice Versa: Some
Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 932, 936-38
(1984) (reviewing E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, 3d ed. 932). Cf. Farnsworth, supra
note 48.
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IV. POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Readers familiar with Dickens' A Christmas Carol will perhaps
have noticed that the preceding discussion has faithfully followed the
spiritual journey Dickens prescribed for Ebenezer Scrooge: look at
where you have been; look at where you are; consider where you will
be if nothing changes; in light of all of that, consider whether change is
now called for. Awakening to find that the unpleasant future he
glimpsed is neither already here nor barreling unavoidably down upon
him, Scrooge sighs with relief, celebrates with a turkey dinner,95 and
resolves to take a fundamentally new tack in the future. If we were to
follow his example, what should we do-indeed, what could we do-
to preserve the values threatened by the privatization of contract law?
One obvious possibility would be to improve arbitration in ways
that respond to its critics. If arbitration is prohibitively costly for
some litigants who might otherwise have a viable (and affordable)
case in court, its costs could be imposed in the first instance on the
party who by drafting the contract has elected to impose it on the
other party. And indeed, some courts have held that an arbitration
scheme must be so structured in order to escape the charge of
unconscionability.96 Some have seen in this intended reform the
specter of conflict of interest, fearing that the party who pays the
lion's share of the cost may, as a result, wield the lion's share of
influence, thus compounding the "repeat player" advantage that they
already see inherent in mandatory arbitration.97 Another type of
change from traditional arbitration procedures would be to open up
arbitration proceedings to the full range of discovery and other pre-
trial procedures ordinarily available in litigation but absent or limited
in arbitral proceedings. But this is, of course, another double-edged
blade. Such a change would make arbitration more like litigation, but
by so doing would remove one of the principal time- and expense-
saving features that make consensual arbitration an attractive
alternative to many disputants."
Similarly, courts could insist that to be a permissible substitute for
litigation, arbitration must hold out the prospect of a panoply of
remedies as complete as those which could be obtained from a court
95. So I wrote originally. Professor Perillo has reminded me quite correctly,
however, that it was a goose, not a turkey. Shades of Frigaliment Importing Co. v.
B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("Chicken is everything
except a goose, a duck, and a turkey.").
96. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 685-88 (Cal. 2000).
97. In his article discussing the pros and cons of mandatory arbitration, Chief
Judge of the D.C. Circuit Harry T. Edwards notes that some have raised the
neutrality issue, but dismisses it as "silly," pointing out that "given the high cost of
arbitration, most employees ... would laugh at the suggestion that they pay half of
the arbitrator's fee in order to ensure neutrality." Edwards, supra note 7, at 302.
98. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 130.
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of law. This position could extend to the whole range of damage
remedies otherwise available, including punitive damages in actions
where those might be awarded.99 It could also include various types of
specific relief, including mandatory and negative injunctions."' And to
meet the systemic problem of consumer (and other) plaintiffs with
real but uneconomically small claims, it would have to include the
possibility of class action proceedings where otherwise appropriate.1"
Even more than the possibility of cost-shifting, such an approach
would obviously defeat one of the principal aims of many mandatory
arbitration schemes, which specifically exclude various types of
damages, and prohibit class action proceedings. Of course, limitations
of remedy have been common features of standardized contracts for
years and it could reasonably be argued that such provisions are no
more objectionable when part of an arbitration scheme than when
contractually imposed as limitations on judicial action. Such
provisions are subject to judicial scrutiny, however, and are to some
extent tamed both by statutory circumscription 2 and judicial
policing." 3 One does not expect arbitration panels to be similarly
adventurous in stepping outside the boundaries apparently laid out for
them; indeed, to do so would be to invite judicial second-guessing,
since exceeding their authority is one of the few things arbitrators can
do that may be susceptible to judicial review.0 4
Another type of fundamental change, more directly responsive to
the above critique, would be to require arbitrators to produce written
decisions, and then to make those decisions subject to judicial review
on the merits."" Like the other suggestions just discussed, these
would make arbitration less objectionable as a substitute for litigation
simply by making it much more like litigation. There would be a
record of past decisions, and new decisions could be scrutinized for
conformity to the rules of law. Whether this pair of changes would be
acceptable to the general run of parties who elect arbitration in
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 281 n.13 (W. Va. 2002)
(holding that agreement excluded punitive damages and class action); Bellsouth
Mobility L.L.C. v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
100. E.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that agreement denied plaintiff possibility of exemplary damages, specific
relief, and attorney fees).
101. E.g., Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (finding that the fact that exclusion of class actions operated equally on both
parties did not obscure its one-sided nature; difficult to imagine circumstances in
which defendant would employ a class action); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding exclusion of class actions unconscionable
and also inefficient); see generally Sternlight, supra note 79.
102. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-718, 2-719.
103. E.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982). See generally James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial
Code §§ 4-6 (4th ed. 1995).
104. Domke, supra note 69, § 34.06.
105. See supra note 83.
20021
HeinOnline -- 71 Fordham L. Rev. 791 2002-2003
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
commercial cases is open to question, however. To add the possibility
of judicial review is, again, to forego some of the comparative
advantage that arbitration enjoys by virtue of its relative swiftness.
Even more to the point in the context of this discussion, it seems
implausible, to say the least, that adhesion-contract-drafters are
looking for a litigation-substitute that mirrors litigation in virtually
every way that one could imagine except that arbitrators have to be
paid substantial fees (particularly if in the first instance such fees had
to be borne by the drafter/proponent of the arbitration clause). They
are looking for a system for resolving their disputes-more
particularly, claims against them-that is fundamentally different
from litigation in ways that advantage them and disadvantage their
potential adversaries.1'6 If mandatory arbitration were really party-
neutral as well as being faster and cheaper than litigation, plaintiffs
would voluntarily accede to it. But they do not. As the case reports
demonstrate, plaintiffs are commonly dragged into arbitration kicking
and screaming. Whether one considers the fact of repeat-player
advantage to be empirically demonstrable or merely anecdotal and
intuitive," 7  the fact remains that corporate defendants want
106. In Bolier v. Superior Court (Harris Research, Inc., r/p/i), 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), the court held invalid because unconscionable that part of an
arbitration clause that required arbitration in Utah instead of the plaintiffs' home
state of California. In the course of its discussion, the court made the following
observations:
... [Defendant] Harris is a large international corporation and petitioners
are small "Mom and Pop" franchisees located in California. When
petitioners first purchased their Chem-Dry franchises in the early 1980's,
Harris was headquartered in California, and the franchise agreement did not
contain an arbitration provision....
Under the circumstances, the ... terms are unduly oppressive: The
agreement requires franchisees wishing to resolve any dispute to close down
their shops, pay for airfare and accommodations in Utah, and ... [hire]
counsel familiar with Utah law. To rub salt in the wound, the agreement
provides franchisees are precluded from consolidating arbitrations to share
these increased costs among themselves. And the potential to recoup
expenses with a favorable verdict is limited by the restriction against
exemplary or punitive damages....
Because Dry-Chem franchises are by nature small businesses, it is simply
not a reasonable or affordable option for franchisees to abandon their
offices for any length of time to litigate a dispute several thousand miles
away....
Harris's prohibition against consolidation, limitation on damages and
forum selection provisions have no justification other than as a means of
maximizing an advantage over the petitioners. Arguably, Harris understood
those terms would effectively preclude its franchisees from ever raising any
claims against it, knowing the increased costs and burden on their small
businesses would be prohibitive. As aptly stated in Arrnendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2000), "Arbitration was
not intended for this purpose."
Butler, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95 (citiation omitted).
107. See generally Bingham, supra note 7 (finding some evidence of existence of
"repeat player" advantage).
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arbitration, and they want it very much.108 As Glinda the Good
remarks of the Wicked Witch of the West's lust for the Ruby Slippers,
"Their magic must be very powerful, or she wouldn't want them so
badly."
A different approach to mandatory arbitration would be to attempt
to improve the level of consent involved, to ensure that parties who
signed onto contracts containing arbitration clauses would understand
(a) that they were doing so, and (b) what the possible implications of
such a choice could be. And, indeed, some critics of mandatory
arbitration have proposed such a course of action.' 9 If-as the FAA
itself declares-the decision to arbitrate must be a voluntary one, as
voluntary as any contractual commitment, then maybe it would be
sufficient to take steps to ensure that adherents to adhesion contracts
with arbitration clauses will be giving a knowledgeable consent to
arbitrate future disputes when they sign on. Sounds good, but there
are some problems with this approach. One is that under the FAA as
currently construed and applied by the Supreme Court and most
lower courts, state and federal, it is virtually impossible for either a
court or a state legislature to take the position that an arbitration
clause must meet standards of disclosure or conspicuousness any
higher than those imposed on any other contractual term.1" Unless
and until there is a change either in the FAA itself or the courts'
application of it, the amount of true "consent" that can be imposed as
a condition to the effectiveness of an arbitration clause will remain
minimal-a weak "reason to know" standard, met simply by the fact
that the adherent did have at least a theoretical opportunity to read
and understand the clause, or to seek counsel in order to decide
whether to adhere to a contract so providing."'
108. Compare Green, supra note 7 (stating that employers are misguided in their
insistence on imposing arbitration on employees; it doesn't actually benefit them),
with Schwartz, supra note 7, at 60-63 (stating that behavior of the parties indicates
that corporate defendants strongly prefer mandatory arbitration and believe that it
lowers their risk of liability).
109. See Harding, supra note 7; Reilly, supra note 7; Silverstein, supra note 7;
Speidel, supra note 7.
110. See Doctor's Assos., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
111. In Green Tree Financial Corp. -Alabama v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 2001),
a fraud action by the buyers of a manufactured home, the Supreme Court of Alabama
considered the possible unconscionability of an arbitration clause in the sale contract.
In the course of its opinion, in which the clause was upheld, the court noted that the
plaintiffs "claim to be illiterate." (emphasis added). In a footnote, the court
elaborated this point:
Jimmy Lewis testified that his parents could not read or write and that they
did not ask anyone to read the installment contract to them because, he says,
they trusted [the seller]. He said that he signed documents in connection
with the manufactured home purchase, but, he said, he did not know what
those documents were. He testified that he had attended school only
through the sixth grade, that he cannot read or write, and that he did not
know what his parents signed because, he says, he trusted [the seller].
Id. at 825 n.5.
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A second reason why a disclosure requirement will have minimal
effect is that a truly informed consent to arbitration would necessarily
entail some understanding of what the choice between litigation and
arbitration might mean to the consenting party. A simple statement
such as, "You will be giving up your right to go to court, and will
instead be required to take any dispute to arbitration" is hardly an
effective disclosure, even if made in 20-point boldface red letters.
This is particularly true if that statement is accompanied simply by a
few reasons why arbitration might be preferable, but it remains true
even if those are balanced with a fuller explanation including some
negative statements. Without having a thorough understanding of the
pros and cons of arbitration in the context of the sorts of dispute likely
to arise in the course of their contractual relationship, or the counsel
of someone who does, adhering parties are in no position to make an
informed consent to arbitration.
But the real reason why disclosure requirements won't cure the
arbitration/adhesion problem is that adhesion contracts are just what
their name implies: contracts of adhesion. They are adhered to-
without necessarily being agreed to, in any substantive sense-in most
cases without any bargaining, because the factual context in which
they are offered and accepted is one which does not lend itself to,
indeed is not susceptible to, bargaining over any but the most basic of
terms. Certainly there is not going to be bargaining over the remedial
provisions in general. Even more certainly than that, there is not
going to be bargaining over the presence or absence of an arbitration
clause. The rare exception is a case where the agreement being
proposed consists of an arbitration clause and virtually nothing else.' 2
Otherwise, there is in most cases no practical way for the adhering
party to get a better or even a different contract than the one
proposed. The only disclosure statement that might actually change
the behavior of contracting parties in the adhesion context is one
which both discloses the pros and cons of arbitration in a neutral and
intelligible fashion, and then gives the adhering party the option of
voluntarily expressing consent to arbitrate, if she chooses, with no
adverse effect on the drafter's willingness to contract if she does not."3
It does not matter anyway, the court declared (quoting an 1894 case): illiteracy
is no defense to enforcement because one who signs an instrument is bound, even if
he cannot read, "in the absence of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id. at 825
(citation omitted). Of course, this was a fraud action.
112. E.g., McCoy v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
113. See Reilly, supra note 7, at 1245-61. Where mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses are concerned, "meaningful choice" would require not only
that the adhering party have sufficient information to enable her to make a
sensible choice between the arbitration scheme being offered and the litigation
alternative, but also that she have a true choice in deciding whether to accept or
reject. "Giving up one's right to a judicial forum versus giving up one's job is
hardly a voluntary choice, particularly when such clauses have become
boilerplate language in employment contracts. Such a 'choice' is naturally
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(Even then, knowledgeable drafters can probably engineer consent in
many cases if they so desire. How many times, dear reader, have
you-prompted by a selling agent-signed or initialed a space or a
box on a standard form, just below language which recites "I have
read and understood the above provisions.. .", knowing you have not,
and do not?). Any weaker disclosure requirement is likely to have, if
anything, an adverse effect on adhering parties, by making it virtually
impossible later to challenge an arbitration clause on any basis,
without materially reducing the number of adhesion contracts
containing arbitration clauses.
All of the above skepticism is not meant to deny the possibility that
many of the above measures, if successfully undertaken, could have a
beneficial effect on the legal climate for contract litigation, where
adhesion contracts are concerned.114 But conceding the unlikelihood
of that happening-and noting that at least some of the steps
discussed might have little or no effect, or even a negative one-what
possibilities remain? One appears to be already underway, and to be
bearing at least some fruit. That is the unconscionability attack. In
the recent case of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,"5 the Supreme
Court passed up the opportunity to limit the scope of the FAA by
construing its language to exclude employment cases generally, in
favor of a much more limited exception only for workers actually
engaged in the transportation of goods in interstate commerce. At the
same time, however, the Court in that case left open the possibility
coercive and therefore involuntary." Id. at 1258.
Speidel envisions a similar regime, which would
provide a choice to take arbitration or leave it without the risk of losing the
job or other contract opportunity. In short, the corporation can refuse to
negotiate over the terms of the arbitration clause but if the individual rejects
arbitration the corporation may not reject the individual for that reason
alone. This is true "voluntary" arbitration, where the individual has both
adequate information and increased choice.
Speidel, supra note 7, at 1087. Professor Samuel Estreicher has argued that for
arbitration programs to work, they must be mandatory and uniform, without free
"opt-out" alternatives. See Estreicher, supra note 7, at 1358. For a case in which the
employee apparently had such an option, see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283
F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). Decided on the heels of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), Ahmed was distinguished from Adams on the ground
that employee Ahmed's contract was not one of adhesion, at least so far as the
arbitration clause was concerned: The terms of the agreement were "clearly spelled
out in written materials and a videotape presentation," he was encouraged to contact
company officials or to consult an attorney before "deciding whether to participate in
the [arbitration] program," and was given 30 days to decide whether or not to opt out
by mailing in a "simple one-page form." Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199-1200.
114. The California legislature passed during its 2002 legislative session several
measures regulating arbitration in various ways involving potential conflicts of
interest on the part of arbitrators and judges, disclosures of various kinds, and fee
arrangements. Governor Gray Davis vetoed some, but signed most of the measures
into law. See Reynolds Holding, Consumers Get Arbitration Help, S.F. Chron., Oct. 2,
2002, at Al.
115. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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that a given arbitration scheme could be found to be unconscionable
under standards of state law, permitting litigation to proceed. That is
just what happened in the Adams case on remand to the Ninth Circuit,
and the Supreme Court subsequently declined to review that
decision.' 6 While the Court has made it clear that here as elsewhere
the issue of unconscionability is one for case-by-case decision, and a
question of fact (albeit for the court, under the U.C.C. and most
decisional law),' 17 many courts both state... and federal" 9 have found
116. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002).
117. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000);
Gilmer v, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
118. Thicklin v. Fantasy Mobile Homes, Inc., 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(holding that arbitration clause in mobile home dealer's contract was unconscionable
to extent that it negated possibility of punitive damages; that portion of clause was
severable and could be stricken by court); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (finding that arbitration clause must meet minimal
standards of fairness; clause limited remedies, imposed costs on employee plaintiffs,
and imposed arbitration on employees while leaving employer free to litigate);
Bellsouth Mobility L.L.C. v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2002) (holding that
defendant's arbitration clause was facially substantively unconscionable because
punitive damages and class action suit denied, and defendant retains option to litigate
while plaintiff does not; defendant entitled to hearing on issue of plaintiff's voluntary
and knowing agreement to clause); East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, No. 2000-IA-01527-SCT,
2002 WL 1584301, at *1 (Miss. July 18, 2002) (finding that truck buyer who claimed
fraud not bound by one-sided arbitration clause); lwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d
989 (Mont. 1999) (deciding that telephone directory publisher's contract with
customer was contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it was
one-sided in favor of drafter and remedies unduly limited; opinion very carefully
worded to avoid repetition of Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto-type conflict with U.S.
Supreme Court (see 517 U.S. 681 (1996))); Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d
647 (Nev. 2002) (finding that arbitration clause in home buyers' contract with
developer was unconscionable where it granted developer's insurer the right to decide
the rules for arbitration and select the arbitrators); O'Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer
Co.. No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002) (holding that
arbitration clause not unconscionable per se, but was when taken in conjunction with
limitation on amount of available remedy, which effectively foreclosed any remedy
for customer of home inspection service); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d
265 (W. Va. 2002) (deciding that customer who claimed fraudulent scheme by jewelry
company was not bound by arbitration clause that prohibited punitive damages and
class action relief, although plaintiff had not succeeded in demonstrating
unconscionability in imposition of costs on customer; lengthy opinion by Starcher, J.,
notable for its discussion of bargaining realities in contracts of adhesion cases and
various strands of jurisprudence affecting enforceability of arbitration clauses).
119. Adams, 279 F.3d 889. On remand from United States Supreme Court, the
arbitration clause in the employees' contract was held unconscionable under the
California state law test of Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, because the clause was one-sided,
too restrictive of remedies and provided for a too-short limitations period. See also
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l. Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
clause in hotel chain's franchise agreement unconscionable under Montana law as
established in Iwen, 977 P.2d 989, and other cases because it gave defendant choice of
litigating claims against franchisee in state or federal court while remitting franchisee
to binding arbitration in Maryland); Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding allegedly "predatory" lender's arbitration clause
unconscionable under California law because remedies were limited, class action was
unavailable, secrecy provisions unduly hampered plaintiffs in obtaining information
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contractual arbitration provisions to be unconscionable in whole or in
part. This is, of course, just the kind of expensive and time-consuming
process that Arthur Leff warned us years ago could not in the long run
produce effective and long-lasting social change,12 but in the absence
of legislative help it may be the best that can be done.
In the long run, of course, it will take either a change of heart on the
part of the United States Supreme Court (well, at least, of a few of its
members) 1' or a willingness on the part of Congress to rein the Court
in. The FAA, even in the Frankensteinian version created by the
Court, is after all an Act of Congress, and Congress indubitably can
revise it.'22 Congress could also take the lesser step of indicating in
other statutory schemes that the rights conferred thereby are not
subject to mandatory arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration
clause-that, at most, disputes later arising between the parties might
be settled or submitted to voluntary arbitration should the parties then
agree to do so. 23 That would be a desirable halfway house, but
unfortunately would have the defect of being both piecemeal and
partial. The fundamental problem of mandatory arbitration of
disputes arising under contracts of adhesion would remain-not only
unaddressed, but possibly exacerbated.'24
regarding defendant's misconduct, and fee provisions were unduly burdensome):
Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
120. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1970). If nothing else, the
arbitration wars have brought unconscionability back to center stage. See Fitzgibbon,
supra note 7.
121. See supra note 62.
122. For one possible form such a revision might take, see Alderman, supra note 7,
at 1264.
123. The Supreme Court has declared that Congress is free to take this position if it
wishes; it has also made it plain that the Court will not find the intent to do so in any
legislation absent the clearest possible statement to that effect, because of the Court-
created "strong federal policy" in favor of arbitration wherever humanly possible.
E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). But see Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
124. Eventually some (or even most, if Congress were unusually prolific, hardly a
likely eventuality) federal statutory rights could be protected against mandatory
arbitration clauses. This would have no effect at all, presumably, on such clauses as
applied to common-law claims, whether in tort or contract. Nor, for that matter,
would it restore the ability of states to regulate arbitration clauses in any meaningful
way, or protect state-created statutory rights against federally-imposed mandatory
arbitration. A more general change in attitude in this area will have to come either
from amendment of the FAA by Congress or from a reconsideration by the Court of
its position in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the
California Franchise Investment Act, which made arbitration agreements
unenforceable, violated the supremacy clause).
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CONCLUSION
I suggested above that the ultimate issues raised by mandatory
arbitration are not simply legal, but political. Clearly, programs for
legislative action raise questions not merely of principle but of politics.
Who benefits? Who is hurt? What will be the ultimate effect of a
given measure on the various interests that are directly affected by it?
On society as a whole? We are all used to the notion that "law" in the
legislative sense does not descend from the sky, it comes out of the
legislative sausage factory. Indeed, nobody pretends otherwise,
probably not even in eighth-grade civics class (if indeed such an
animal still exists). On the other hand, there are perhaps still those
who believe that judicially-created "law" does in fact descend from
some Platonic realm of disinterested abstraction. That view was once
the mindset of contract-law students and perhaps even of their
teachers, as evidenced by the "classical" contract law of Langdell,
Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts. But it's been nearly
a hundred years since the Legal Realists pointed out that all law is
political, even the judge-made variety, and from there to Bush v.
Gore'25 is a long distance only chronologically.
So ultimately the choice is a political one, whether made by a
legislature (state or federal), or by a court. Can powerful private
interests, with the ability to control most of the terms of most of the
contracts they make, deprive large segments of American society of
their access to the courts for which all of us pay, and to which all of us
have historically had access? The answer, until now, is-sadly, to
some of us-that apparently they can.
And do.
And will.
125. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term
Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4,158 et seq. (2001).
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